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The recent Space Policy Directive-3, issued on June 18th, 2018, commands several sectors of the
federal executive apparatus to reassess their current and future efforts to address space traffic
management and space situational awareness issues. The reasons for this Directive can be boiled
down to the belief that the continued use of the orbital realm depends on responsible
management, which in turn depends on myriad factors that include the development of new
technologies, the refinement of data gathering, and the clarification of governmental operational
roles. In particular, the Directive calls for enhanced standardization of safety and best practices,
and doles out tasks for relevant agencies, among which the Federal Communications
Commission plays a significant role. Given the FCCs influence on the licensure of satellites and
the proliferation of constellations, it will be a leader in fulfilling the obligations set out in SPD-3.
In October of 2018, the FCC announced it would revisit its much older orbital debris
management rules, with an eye towards their revision and in light of its responsibility for
increasing traffic in outer space. In November, they released their Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, in which they tackle a multitude of germane topics, from spectrum use to orbital
lifetime, and from choice of orbit to post-mission disposal. This essay proposes to examine how
the FCC’s planned changes will address concerns outlined in SPD-3, and what work remains to
be done.

I. Introduction
In June of 2018, President Trump released Space Policy Directive-3. This Directive was
a detailed document, providing guidance and direction for several federal agencies involved in
the matter of securing the continued use and enjoyment of the outer space environment. Its focus
was on the furtherance of Space Traffic Management (STM) policy, along with the related field
of Space Situational Awareness (SSA). The scope and depth of federal responsibility for
improving these fields are expanded in SPD-3, with several federal agencies, departments, and
their heads being drafted into revitalizing procedures for information gathering, inter-agency
cooperation, and revision of extant policies and regulations. Chief among the threats assessed by
this policy is orbital debris. The new policy aims to control and contain this threat, which poses
dangers not only to the national economy, but also to national security and the ability to use and
explore space more generally.
Separate from yet related to the STM concerns of the current administration is the
regulatory mission of the Federal Communications Commission. The FCC has several tasks to
perform in many arenas of public and private life, among these the responsibility to serve the

public good when considering whether to license satellites launched into outer space. Given the
need for most such satellites to utilize radiocommunication in order to properly function, the
FCC’s topical authority is clear.1 The Commission has announced that it is aware of the release
and meaning of SPD-3, yet “the Commission’s efforts to formulate this NPRM on orbital debris
mitigation have been underway for some time, and we believe our proposals may provide a
method of elevating these important issues for consideration among federal policymakers and
stakeholders.”2 Presently, then, we are seeing the confluence of both Space Policy Directive-3,
and proposed rules and revisions to extant FCC orbital debris requirements.
Currently, the United States Government operates to prevent new sources of orbital
debris through a variety of means. Predominant among these are the U.S. Government Orbital
Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, although the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration analyzes the potential for debris creation during its licensing process 3, as does the
FCC. These processes will continue to be linked to the new STM efforts promoted by SPD-3.
SPD-3 specifically orders the Administrator of NASA to work with several relevant
federal agencies, including the Federal Communications Commission, to update and evolve the
U.S. Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices.4 Specifically, the policy mandates that the
Chairman work with other relevant federal heads in order to develop best practices and standards
for space traffic5, prevent radio interference with space assets6, and ensure compliance with
international treaty obligations—most prominently the Registration Convention.7
2018 proved to be a significant year for STM, which saw both SPD-3, and independent
FCC hearings and rulemaking. The full impacts of SPD-3 will take time to understand, both on
space traffic management generally, and the particular regulations emerging from renewed
Commission focus on the matter. Given the release of the NPRM to the Federal Register on
February 19th, 2019, and that it is open to commentary until April 5th, 2019 (with responses due
on May 6th), much could change beyond that of the Proposed Rule. At this stage in the process,
there is a clear direction towards greater reporting on and assessment of orbital debris plans for
license applicants, along with stronger efforts at preventative measures designed to take
advantage of knowledge of how debris is generated and propagated.
To that end, it is safe to conclude that the last two years have seen significant policy
development for space activities coming from the executive branch, and that more efforts are
underway. In analyzing the nature and extent of the FCC’s growing role in space traffic
“The Commission has observed that robotic spacecraft are typically controlled through radiocommunications links,
and thus there is a direct connection between the satellite’s radiocommunications functions and the physical
operations of spacecraft.” Mitigation of Orbital Debris, Second Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 11567, 11575, para.
14 (2004) (Orbital Debris Order).
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management, this essay hopes to highlight three key findings stemming from SPD-3 and FCC
regulations. Firstly, the efforts of the FCC to stem the creation and proliferation of orbital debris
is central to the White House’s view of the Commission’s place in a renewed space traffic
management regime. Secondly, the fifteen years that have elapsed between the extant rules and
the new Proposed Rule, as well as the rapidly expanding market for constellations of satellites
requiring FCC licensure, have taught the FCC that refreshed rules must take the experience of
other agencies and the best practices of advisory groups into consideration for future work.
Finally, the FCC is engaged in something of an administrative soul-searching regarding its
proper function in the greater STM scheme going forward. Each of these findings has, and will
continue to have, substantial influence on STM and SSA.

II. Policy & Regulatory Influences
In adopting new rules, the Commission is hardly working in the dark. While some within the
Commission question the proper nature of FCC interfacing with and enforcing debris standards
(see below), it has been in this position before, with the orbital debris rules it adopted in 2004.8
Then, as now, the Commission could rely on several available documents and standards to
ascertain their own rules. The following section briefly describes several of these, and how they
can and do impact the current discussion between the FCC and the general public.
•

U.S. National Space Policy9: The 2010 Space Policy operates as the foundational
guidance for numerous federal efforts at securing, using, and protecting the space
environs. It speaks to the clear value of outer space, the necessity of its continued use,
and that threats—including to the space environment—cannot be ignored. President
Obama’s opening statement for the Policy mentioned the “decades of space activity [that]
have littered the Earth’s orbit with debris”10, and notes the United States is up to the
challenge this poses. Further, the document proposes to continue strengthening the
stability of the outer space environment, which includes creating tougher measures with
which to address orbital debris.11 Additional efforts to preserve the value of the space
environment are described in the Policy, but most of note here is the requirement that
heads of U.S. agencies would need to approve any exceptions to the U.S. Government
Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices.12

•

U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices13: In 1997, NASA and
other partners developed what would become the primary practices document to be used
by all federal agencies (starting in 2001) in their use of space, and these in turn were
openly shared with industry in the hopes of encouraging best practices by public and

8

Mitigation of Orbital Debris, Second Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 11567, 11575, para. 14 (2004) (Orbital Debris
Order).
9
National Space Policy of the United States of America, available at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf.
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Id. at 2.
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Id. at 4.
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Id. at 8.
13
U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, available at https://www.iadconline.org/References/Docu/USG_OD_Standard_Practices.pdf. [Hereinafter U.S. Mitigation Practices.]
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private actors alike.14 The Practices contain four objectives: 1) any space programs will
assess how likely they are to create debris in their normal operations, and seek to limit
debris creation; 2) programs will assess the likeliness of explosions for space
operations—including after the mission is complete—and attempt to reduce the
possibility of such an explosion happening; 3) programs will work to ensure their space
objects do not collide with other man-made objects, or with natural debris from objects
like micrometeoroids; 4) and that missions will make efforts to find cost-effective
processes to minimize the impact of current programs on future missions.15 Each of these
objectives contain explanatory sections that delineate programmatic behaviors to ensure
success, though they are arguably flexible enough to allow reasonable deviation when
expense or unique mission profiles allow.
•

NASA Technical Standard16: NASA has adopted an extensive policy in order to fulfil
NASA Procedural Requirement 8715.6 (the NASA Procedural Requirements for
Limiting Orbital Debris).17 The standard’s weighty procedures are used in conjunction
with NASA missions, and give that administration specific instructions that, in theory,
will reduce the creation of new debris due to NASA’s missions. It notes that it “is
required to be used for orbital debris assessments for all payloads, launch vehicle orbital
stages, and released objects….”18 Importantly, NASA views this document to be
consistent with, and in furtherance of, the National Space Policy, the IADC Guidelines,
and the U.S. Government Standard Practices19, which demonstrates the interconnected
nature of both domestic and international debris policies.

•

IADC Guidelines20: these Guidelines set forth an international effort to combat debris
creation, and they mirror several efforts from the United States and other individual
States. They are representative of the best practices recommended by several State space
agencies, including NASA, JAXA, ROSCOSMOS, CNES, and others.21 While the
guidance contained within the document is less dense than the NASA Technical
Standard, the spirit remains the same—work towards eliminating new sources of debris,
in order to preserve the future utility of the space environment for all States.

•

Space Policy Directive-322: Perhaps the greatest impetus for modifying the current FCC
Orbital Debris Order (2004) comes from the actions of the Trump White House. In his
third Space Policy Directive, President Trump ordered a large-scale review and evolution
of space traffic management strategy and policy. After generally describing the ways in
which using the space environment benefits the United States economically,
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scientifically, and in defense, the Directive calls for revisions to current procedures. The
long-used U.S. Government Standard Practices are now “inadequate to control the
growth of orbital debris. These standard practices should be updated to address current
and future space operating environments.”23 Specifically, the Federal Communications
Commission is tasked with assisting in the renovation of U.S. efforts in the field of space
debris management, along with other relevant agencies. Part of this requires an interagency effort, of which the FCC is a member, to create better technical standards, safety
practices, behavioral norms, and standards for the prevention of on-orbit collisions.24
These are some of the primary tools the Commission had in its possession when
redesigning their new Proposed Rule. It can, at least in part, explain repeated references in the
NPRM to the expertise of other agencies, including (and especially) NASA. For instance, when
seeking input from the public regarding the safety of flight profiles, the Commission spoke of the
probability of collisions between objects within the LEO region, referencing the relationship
between energy and orbit of an object via NASA’s Technical Standard.25

III. Proposed Rule: Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age
Prior to the release of the Proposed Rule in early 2019, the Commission drafted and
adopted a report, FCC 18-159, explaining their views on the necessity of reexamining the older
rules. The report also announced the proposed rules it intended to supply to the Federal Register
for notice and comment from the public. The Commission’s justifications for coming back to the
topic after more than a decade ranged from the proliferation of objects in space, to the potential
damage to the sizeable space economy from errant debris, to the harm to the health and safety of
people on Earth.26 In reexamining their rules for orbital debris, the Commission has
demonstrated that: 1) they are willing, able, and motivated to provide additional rigor and
breadth to the existing rules; and 2) that they both desire and need input from the public to do so
effectively. The Proposed Rule may look ready to implement, but the NPRM is replete with
dozens of questions and calls for responses to their new (potential) regulations.
Some of these solicitations concern particular parties (e.g., private satellite operators,
amateur operators, etc.). For instance, “the Commission seeks comment on the suitability of
various orbital debris mitigation guidance and standards for application to non-Federal satellite
systems.”27 Others concern basic questions of added numerical details for risk assessments (e.g.,
whether percentages ought to be attached to certain kinds of behaviors or objects that could
generate additional debris).
Importantly, in its request for comments, the Commission appears particularly concerned
with the presence and expansion of constellations of satellites. Indeed, “proposed deployments
23
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of large satellite constellations in the intensely used LEO region…will have the potential to
increase the risk of debris-generating events.”28 In several places, it seeks comments on whether
more stringent controls need to be placed on such systems, and in what manner. For instance,
when addressing the safety of flight profiles:
The Commission seeks comment on whether, if a spacecraft’s orbital debris mitigation
plan includes maneuvering to avoid collisions, the Commission should, consistent with
current licensing practice, consider the risk to be zero…the NASA Standard applies the
0.001 metric on a per-spacecraft basis. The Commission invites comment on whether
this metric should also be applied on an aggregate, system-wide basis, i.e., 0.001 for an
entire constellation.29
Other commentary on constellations, and their impact on the debris potential, appear on
no fewer than ten pages of the NPRM. Clearly, large-scale operations currently weigh heavily
on the minds of the Commissioners.
Taken as a whole, and far from flailing about looking for its raison d’être in
governmental debris management policy, the sea of questions presented in the NPRM indicate
the seriousness with which the Commission is taking its mandate. The extent of their probing
serves the concerns of Commissioners who felt that more information was needed, especially
concerning the issue of expertise.30 Given the importance attached to the issue by the
Commission’s statements in FCC 18-159, the questions posed will serve as a potentially rich
vein of policy and technical wisdom from which a Final Rule can be crafted. If this turns out not
to be true, and if the feedback the Commission receives is largely unhelpful, at the very least
they have made clear their reasoning in propounding their draft of the Proposed Rule. From this,
it can be taken that the Commission is certainly moving regulation on the matter of debris—
whether forwards or otherwise remains to be seen, although FCC 18-159 is clear that waiting to
address the perceived problem is not an option, especially in light of continuous and increasing
use of the orbital environment.
The domestic pressures to revise regulations are one of the factors driving this NPRM.
However, another reason for the reconsideration of the earlier rules is conformity with
international law and policy. The Commission references both the sustainability guidelines of
UNCOPUOS31, and the IADC Mitigation Guidelines32 as critical to its work. Redrafting
licensing requirements and standards to accord with those documents reflects the international
level of concern involved whilst simultaneously serving the spirit of the National Space Policy
and subsequent executive guidance.

IV. Informational & Operational Norms

28
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Id. at 4745.
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See, e.g., FCC 18-159, supra note 2, Statement of Commissioner Carr, at 61.
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The Proposed Rule focuses predominantly on two methods of combating orbital debris:
firstly, disclosure of germane information in the form of reporting by applicants for licensure.
Secondly, the Commission is recommending operational procedures to enhance safety of
operations for satellites and space objects used to deploy them. The Proposed Rule both
modifies and adds to the current rule in several key ways, each of which are designed to fulfil the
Commission’s goals of serving the public interest.
In one informational evolution, the Commission has revised requirements involving the
assessment of and planning for the release of debris during natural operations of satellites. Prior
to the NPRM, the rule required the satellite operator to assess and minimize the possibility of the
release of new sources of debris.33 However, this did not include a requirement to assess
whether any deployment devices, i.e. devices launched into space that then release satellites into
orbit, are to be used, nor did it require operators to justify why they chose to use any unorthodox
methods in deployment. The Proposed Rule rectifies this, by requiring a “statement [that] must
include an orbital debris mitigation disclosure for any separate deployment devices not part of
the space station launch that may become a source of orbital debris”34. This is required in
several parts of the new rule35, and ostensibly would serve to require justifying36 the use of
materials that could enhance the creation of new debris.
Likewise, the original rule did not account for the possibility that liquids could
themselves, once outside of their spacecraft, become sources of debris. The Proposed Rule
requires “a statement that the space station operator has assessed and limited the probability of
accidental explosions or release of liquids that could become debris during and after completion
of mission operations.”37
Another change requires more information about safety of flight profiles (for instance,
curiously, current rules require an assessment of the probability of collision in space, but do not
require a specific probability estimation to be provided; i.e., no numeric value need be applied to
the probability).38 In contrast, the NPRM requires a metric to be adopted that is derived from the
NASA Standard, specifically that “the probability that their spacecraft will collide with a large
object during the orbital lifetime of the spacecraft will be no greater than 0.001”.39
Some of the proposed Operational requirements include requiring that stations planned
for operation in the 650-2,000 km range be deployed below the 650 km mark, and then
maneuvered into the proper position.40 The reasoning behind this being that objects in LEO are
thought to generally fall back to the Earth within a 25 year period when not corrected or
maintained, which limits their risk as potential objects for collision.

33

47 CFR § 25.114(d)(14)(i).
Proposed Rule, supra note 27, Sec. 5.64(b)(1), at 4754.
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Id., Sec. 25.114(d)(14)(i), at 4755.
36
FCC 18-159, supra note 2, at 9.
37
Proposed Rule, supra note 27, Sec. 5.64(b)(3), at 4754.
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47 CFR § 25.114(d)(14)(iii).
39
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Proposed Rule, supra note 27, Sec. 25.114(d)(14)(v)(C)(2), at 4756.
34

7

There are several other significant changes, but one that deserves particular attention is
the notion of operator insurance, and the concept of indemnifying the government. The prior
debris order
…declines to adopt a rule requiring space station operator to obtain insurance to protect
the United States from exposure to liability claims arising from orbital debris, but states
insurance and liability issues will continue to play a role in the determination of whether
approval of a particular debris mitigation plan serves the public interest.41
In contrast, the Proposed Rule requires that, “as a condition of their licenses for
experimental satellite facilities, licensees must submit an executed agreement indemnifying the
United States against any costs associated with a claim brought against the United States related
to the authorized facilities.”42 Such an indemnification requirement is a strong step in
recognizing the damage that can occur not only to the physical environment of space, but to the
United States more generally should damage occur for which it could be found liable.
Given these changes, the Proposed Rule differs most substantially from the 2004 Rule in
its expansive, if occasionally confused43 efforts to comply with SPD-3’s mandates while also
updating its own regulations with new informational and operational tasks, all of which are
designed to address the overarching problem of debris generation. Further, while these efforts
clearly do not directly address Space Policy Directive-3’s very specific command to renovate the
U.S. Government Orbital Debris Standard Practices, they can be seen as a step in the direction of
creating new “guidelines for satellite design and operation”.44 With the SPD-3 contemplating the
incorporation of new standards into licensing regimes for the various agencies involved in space
operations45, the FCC’s efforts in revising their own processes independently of a new set of U.S.
Standard Practices indicates an effort to get ahead of the inter-agency game, and to continue
propounding appropriate rules as it sees fit under its current regulatory mandate.

V. Existential Communications Commission?
The final rule will be some time in coming, but some in the FCC have begun to question
whether they are even the appropriate body to address orbital debris. In both the November 2018
report notifying the decision to update their rules, and again in the Proposed Rule, there is
evidence of discomfort in a communications branch regulating space traffic management issues.
Specifically, Commissioner Carr noted that they are literally dealing with rocket science, and as
such, asks “are we the expert agency to make these assessments?...Should the FCC be one of the
lead agencies? Should we play a supporting and coordinating role instead?”46

41

Mitigation of Orbital Debris, Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 69, No. 174, September 9, 2004, p. 54586.
Proposed Rule, supra note 27, Sec. 5.64(c), at 4754.
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Further, and in part to ameliorate Commissioner Carr’s concerns, the Proposed Rule’s
initial data-gathering segment is littered with requests for comment by anyone or any group with
something to say on the new rules. Moreover, the Commission asks whether they are even the
best group to deal with the matter of orbital debris, or if other agencies would be better suited. It
states:
“More broadly, the Commission seeks comment on the appropriate role of the
Commission given the various stakeholder agencies and other entities. As discussed
above, there are a number of agencies and entities with expertise and interest in
mitigating the growth of orbital debris. With various entities playing a role, how does the
Commission ensure an appropriate, coordinated approach that avoids duplication of
efforts? How can the Commission ensure clarity regarding the roles that various entities
can or should play? What agency or entity has the greatest expertise when it comes to the
technical, engineering, mathematic, and scientific expertise needed to address orbital
debris?”47
While not directly doubting its own capabilities, the Commission shows no qualms in
querying the public for direct thoughts on which agencies ought to handle these issues. As an
arm of the White House’s efforts on modifying the current STM approach, such solicitations
could assist in properly placing the Commission’s work in conjunction with those of entities like
NASA and the Department of Defense. Further, despite expressing some doubt as to their
mandate, the Commission muddled through with its proposal. Given the flexibility suggested in
the justification and question sections preceding the actual Proposed Rule, it would not be
surprising to see some of the informational and operational rules shift in tone and extent when
the Final Rule is released.
In contrast to the questioning posed by her colleagues, Commissioner Rosenworcel is
confident in the necessity of the FCC’s work to reign in orbital debris. In her concurrence to the
decision to propose new rules, she expresses frustration that the Commission is not being
forceful enough in tackling the problem. Indeed, “instead of moving forward aggressively—as
our draft effort contemplated—we backtrack and add confusing language about whether or not
this work should even continue in these halls. This is not the leadership we need as we embark
on a new era in space.”48 Commissioner Michael O’Rielly also seems comfortable with the
FCC’s involvement in the issues, although he finds “some of the reporting proposals somewhat
timid, and the preventative ideas may be premature or uncooked….”49 In theory, the comments
received from the public for the NPRM may determine the “doneness” of the new regulations.

VI. Concluding Thoughts
Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of this NPRM exercise is in its possible outcomes.
So much can change with the new rules, once input from the public has been received and
processed. Alternatively, perhaps the Final Rule will look nearly identical to that presently
47
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49
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proposed. Either way, it is clear that the FCC, for whatever doubts it may possess as to its
function in the greater orbital debris and STM schemes, is situated to continue impacting federal
efforts to minimize threats to the use, exploration, and exploitation of orbital space. With both
internal Commission and external administrative pressures to adapt to the future of orbital debris
management, the FCC remains firmly ensconced as a policy and regulatory force in STM.
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